All the President’s Tweets… and Section 230 of the CDA

On May 28, 2020, President Donald Trump issued the Executive Order on Preventing Online Censorship (EO) directing the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Attorney General, to request that the Federal Communications Commission “expeditiously propose” regulations to clarify when a provider of an interactive computer service screening offensive content under Section 230 (c)(2)(A) of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) would not be able to benefit from the Good Samaritan provision of the CDA.

Twitter called the EO “a reactionary and politicized approach to a landmark law.” An executive order is not a law, and Congress cannot overturn the order. However, the EO requires a clarification of the law. Law are clarified and interpreted by the courts; they are not clarified by government agencies.

The CDA is an essential law of the web

The CDA is an important federal law, as, without it, the web as we know it would not be able to function, as intermediaries would be constantly held liable for torts, such as defamation, and would have to defend themselves in courts.

The law was passed by Congress after a New York court held in Stratton Oakmont, Inc., v. Prodigy Servs. that the operator of a computer bulletin board, where a third party had posted defamatory allegations, was a publisher. Congress explained in 1996 that “[one] of the specific purposes of [section 230] is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because  they have restricted access to objectionable  material.”

What led to this EO

The EO was signed following Twitter’s decision to add a civic integrity notice to two tweets posted by the President on May 26, 2020 which alleged mail-in ballot fraud in California (see here and here). The warning is a link reading “! Get the facts about mail-in ballots” and leads to a page offering a counter view. Twitter explained that it had done so “as part of our efforts to enforce our civic integrity policy. We believe those Tweets could confuse voters about what they need to do to receive a ballot and participate in the election process.”

President Trump reacted to this move on Twitter, posting “….Twitter is completely stifling FREE SPEECH, and I, as President, will not allow it to happen!

The President is taking the view that his freedom of speech has been abridged by Twitter, a private company. The First Amendment of the Constitution does not generally protect freedom of speech, but instead prevents Congress from passing laws abridging freedom of speech. This means private companies may choose to set their own policies regulating speech, if they do not violate laws (this would be the case, for instance, if a private policy violated the Civil Rights Act).

The EO states that:

Twitter now selectively decides to place a warning label on certain tweets in a manner that clearly reflects political bias.  As has been reported, Twitter seems never to have placed such a label on another politician’s tweet.  As recently as last week, Representative Adam Schiff was continuing to mislead his followers by peddling the long-disproved Russian Collusion Hoax, and Twitter did not flag those tweets.  Unsurprisingly, its officer in charge of so-called ‘Site Integrity’ has flaunted his political bias in his own tweets.

The EO appears to be less an official order than a personal message from the President lashing out at Twitter, at one of its employees in charge of Site Integrity, who has been named in another of the  President’s tweets, and even at Representative Adam Schiff, the lead impeachment manager in the case which led to the impeachment of the President.

The Good Samaritan provisions of the CDA

Section 230 (c)(1) of the CDA created a safe harbor for providers and users of an interactive computer service for blocking and screening offensive material.

The CDA definition of “interactive computer service” includes information service, system, or access software provider providing or enabling computer access by multiple users to a computer server. They are, for instance, webhosts, search engines, e-commerce, and, yes, social media platforms, such as Twitter.

They are immune because they only act as intermediaries of third-party content. As such, they cannot be held liable for content posted through their services. They are intermediaries, not publishers.

The immunity for screening offensive content of the CDA

Section 230 (c)(2)(A) excludes provider or user of interactive computer services from civil liability for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”

The EO argues:

It is the policy of the United States to ensure that, to the maximum extent permissible under the law, this provision is not distorted to provide liability protection for online platforms that — far from acting in “good faith” to remove objectionable content — instead engage in deceptive or pretextual actions (often contrary to their stated terms of service) to stifle viewpoints with which they disagree.

The argument is that platforms are taking advantage of their power to screen offensive content, even content protected by the First Amendment, to promote their point of view.

What does the EO aim to achieve?

The EO argues that:

In a country that has long cherished the freedom of expression, we cannot allow a limited number of online platforms to hand pick the speech that Americans may access and convey on the internet.  This practice is fundamentally un-American and anti-democratic.  When large, powerful social media companies censor opinions with which they disagree, they exercise a dangerous power.  They cease functioning as passive bulletin boards, and ought to be viewed and treated as content creators.

The argument is that social media platforms have now taken the role of a publisher and should no longer being able to be protected by Section 230 safe harbor.

The EO calls for the clarification of the scope of Section 230 immunity, arguing that “the immunity should not extend beyond its text and purpose to provide protection for those who purport to provide users a forum for free and open speech, but in reality use their power over a vital means of communication to engage in deceptive or pretextual actions stifling free and open debate by censoring certain viewpoints.”

The scope of section 230 immunity is at stake

The EO further argues that:

When an interactive computer service provider removes or restricts access to content and its actions do not meet the criteria of subparagraph (c)(2)(A), it is engaged in editorial conduct.  It is the policy of the United States that such a provider should properly lose the limited liability shield of subparagraph (c)(2)(A) and be exposed to liability like any traditional editor and publisher that is not an online provider.

The “criteria” of Section 230 (c)(2)(A) is not clear. The Court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently noted in Enigma Software Group USA v. Malwarebytes, Inc. that the term “otherwise objectionable” is a “catchall” phrase, citing Judge Fisher’s concurring  opinion in Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., and reviewed the legislative history of the CDA, as a law aiming at protecting minors from online pornography. The Ninth Circuit court recognized in Enigmathat interpreting the statute to give providers unbridled discretion to block online content would, as Judge Fisher warned, enable and potentially motivate internet-service providers to act for their own, and not the public, benefit.”

The EO argues that the purpose of Section 203 (c) is “narrow,” thus appearing to argue that the CDA’s goal was only to protect users against pornography. However, the Supreme Court held in 1997, in Reno v. ACLU , that two provisions of the CDA, one for imposing sanctions for knowingly transmitting obscene or indecent messages, the other for sending patently offensive material to minors, were unconstitutional as abridging freedom of speech.

Yet, the CDA played in vital role in the development of the web as we know it, including social media, even after being stripped from provisions which had, in essence, given it its name, the Communications Decency Act… Therefore, the scope of Section 230 (c)(2)(A) is likely broader than pornography (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment, see Roth v. United States.)

Congressional statutory findings for the CDA stated that interactive computer services “offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity,” and appeared to have broader goals for passing the law. It is an essential law for the web as we know it to operate. While the EO aims at preventing online censorship, it would likely lead to constant censorship, to the point that the social media business model may be seriously impacted, while impairing the robust marketplace of ideas, which is ideally created by the First Amendment.

Do facts still exist?

The tweets which had warranted the Twitter warning read:

There is NO WAY (ZERO!) that Mail-In Ballots will be anything less than substantially fraudulent. Mail boxes will be robbed, ballots will be forged & even illegally printed out & fraudulently signed. The Governor of California is sending Ballots to millions of people, anyone….. living in the state, no matter who they are or how they got there, will get one. That will be followed up with professionals telling all of these people, many of whom have never even thought of voting before, how, and for whom, to vote. This will be a Rigged Election. No way!

These statements have not been substantiated and thus breached Twitter’s civic integrity policy, under which Twitter’s services cannot be used “for the purpose of manipulating or interfering in elections or other civic processes.”

Twitter’s notice page featured several tweets taking the view that the President’s voting fraud claims were unsubstantiated, included a tweet featuring a link to a press release from the office of California Governor Gavin Newsom about his executive order requiring mail-in ballots to be sent to each Californian registered voter for the November General Election.

However, even a statement coming from an official source may soon no longer be trustworthy. On May 29, a tweet from the White House account was flagged by Twitter as breaching the platform’s glorification of violence policy.  Are we indeed living in a post-truth world?

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Is Trading Twitter Profiles a Violation of Alabama Right of Publicity Act?

On 24 August 2016, Jason Parker and other Twitter users residing in Alabama filed a putative class action suit against Twitter and Hey Inc., the maker of the Stolen app, which allows players to use Twitter profiles, including those of the plaintiffs, to create profile cards to be traded online. Plaintiffs claim this is a violation of the recently enacted Alabama Right of Publicity Act, Alabama Code 1975 § 6-5-770, et seq.

According to the complaint, Hey entered into a partnership with Twitter around June 2015. The micro-blogging company allowed Hey to access its application programming interface so that information about Twitter’s users accounts could be imported into the app. Hey then imported the identities of Twitter users, including their names and photographs, into the app, even though they had not consented to it.

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Hey, Inc. started selling its “Stolen” app on October 2015, by invitation only or to everyone with a verified Twitter profile. Stolen users could buy and sell Twitter profile images online as if they are trading cards. They were given some virtual credit when signing up for the game and earned more credit when playing the game and could buy more credit using real-world currency.

Initially, the profile mentioned that the profile “belonged” to the Stolen user who “owned” the profile he had bought, but this was changed to show instead that the player had “stolen” the profile. To steal a profile meant that a user had bought a particular profile for a higher price than the one paid by another user.

Even more troublesome, users owning a particular profile on Stolen could alter the name of the profile, even by using derogatory terms. This led Representative Katherine M. Clark (D-MA5) to send a letter on 12 January 2016, to Jack Dorsey, Twitter’s CEO, and to Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, which sells the app. Representative Clark was concerned about possible use of this app as a “tool to harass, bully and intimidate,“ particularly women and people of color.”

The renaming function was deleted by Hey on 12 January 2016, but Representative Clark was also concerned about the use of the Twitter profiles without the consent of their owners. She asked Dorsey to “immediately suspend Stolen access to Twitter until nonconsenting profiles are removed and safeguards are implemented to ensure that no Twitter profile may be used by the [app] without clear, express consent.”

Hey temporarily pulled the app from the Apple’s store the same day, posting on Twitter: “We’ve heard everyone’s concerns and have decided the best thing to do is to shut down.” It then launched a new app, “Famous: The Celebrity Twitter,” which the complaint alleges is merely a re-brand of Stolen, because its “nature and core functionality (and look and feel) remain the same.” The complaint further argues that the app continued to “allow its players to display ownership over real-life people by spending virtual currency,” and that it is just “Stolen with a new name.” They claim this a violation of Alabama right of publicity law.

The broad scope of the Alabama Right of Publicity Act

The Alabama Right of Publicity Act went into effect on 1 August 2015. It protects the right of publicity of individuals “in any Indicia of Identity,” which is defined by Section 6-5-771 as “[i]nclud[ing] those attributes of a person that serve to identify that person to an ordinary, reasonable viewer or listener, including, but not limited to, name, signature, photograph, image, likeness, voice, or a substantially similar imitation of one or more of those attributes.” The scope of the Alabama law is rather broad, as “indicia of identity” protects even representation merely evoking the person, if it is substantially similar, which is a concept open to interpretation.

The commercial use of the indicia of identity of a person without consent entitles this person to monetary relief, statutory and punitive damages, and injunctive relief. The use must have been “in products, goods, merchandise, or services entered into commerce in this state, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, goods, merchandise, or services, or for purposes of fund-raising or solicitation of donations, or for false endorsement.” In our case, there is little doubt that the Alabama Right of Publicity Act protects Twitter profiles, even if the profile does not feature a person’s real name, but rather her avatar or other biographical element allowing for her identification.

There is no federal right of publicity law, and the states have their own laws, which differ in scope. New York right of publicity law, New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, protects only the commercial use of a “name, portrait or picture.” California law, California civil Code section 3344-3346, is broader than New York law as it protects against unauthorized commercial use of “name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness,” but is not as broad as Alabama law. Such difference in state right of publicity laws may lead to forum shopping. Indeed, the Alabama law would have favored Lindsay Lohan, who lost in September 2016 her New York right of publicity suit against the makers of the video game Grand Theft Auto, because the game “never referred to Lohan by name or used her actual name in the video game, never used Lohan herself as an actor for the video game, and never used a photograph of Lohan.” Lindsay Lohan, however, may have won her case under Alabama law.

Black market for influencer marketing?

This case is interesting as it shows that social media profiles have monetary value, and for different reasons. In this case, Twitter was able to license their use for Hey’s commercial gaming purposes. But profiles can also be used for marketing purposes. An article published online noted that if a player owns a profile on Stolen, he could then use it to promote his own products. Such use would create a sort of black market for influencer marketing, which occurs when companies are tapping into the influencing buying power of a social media star to promote their products or services. Even if, say, Kim Kardashian does not endorse a particular product on her various social media accounts, the company making the product could still “steal” her profile on Stolen and use it as a way to promote the product, as long as it is able to hold the profile. This complaint is only against Hey and Twitter. Could a complaint against one of the Stolen users also be successful, if filed?

This article was first published on the TTLF Newsletter on Transatlantic Antitrust and IPR Developments published by the Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Technology Law Forum.

Image is courtesy of Flickr user Esther Vargas under a CC BY-SA 2.0 license.

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Did you RT a © today? Photographer Sues Infringers and Retweeters

A photographer is suing a beverage company which allegedly used without permission one of his photographs on social media. The case is interesting, as the photographer chose to sue not only the company and its employees and contractors, but also the social media users who republished the photograph on social media, by a retweet, or a pin. The case is Dennis Flaherty v. Big Red, 1:15-cv-00566.Dennis Flaherty (Plaintiff) is a professional photographer, living in California. He claims that beverage company Big Red (Defendant) used without permission one of his photographs representing Fort Alamo at night, or a “near perfect copy” of it, to create social media postings marking the 179th anniversary of the Battle of the Alamo, which ended on March 6, 1836. Big Red is located in Texas and thus the photograph “conveys a meaning and a direct relationship” with its place of business. Plaintiff owns the copyright of the photograph and registered it with the Copyright Office.16358615653_6305c3e39a_z

Defendant allegedly added a watermark or logo of BIG RED on the photograph before posting it online and Plaintiff claims that, as such, Defendant placed its registered trademark on the photograph. Plaintiff provided screenshots of alleged social media use of this photograph by Defendant (see here for screen shot of use on Twitter and on Facebook). They show images of Fort Alamo at night, identical or very similar to Plaintiff’s own photograph, with some slight modifications such as deleting a flag pole. Plaintiff is seeking  statutory damages for copyright infringement.

Posting on Social Media as Vicarious Infringement

Plaintiff is also suing John Does, employees or contactors of Big Red who were in charge of creating, monitoring, controlling and editing these social accounts, for vicarious copyright infringement, which “occurred because Defendants have or had a right and ability to supervise the infringing act, and received a benefit or a direct financial interest therefrom.” The complaint alleges that Defendants “received a direct financial benefit” from the infringing use of the photograph, as at was used to “draw…. customers, third parties, internet users, followers… to Defendants business activities.” Plaintiff is seeking actual, or, alternatively, statutory damages for vicarious infringement.

Retweeting as Contributory Infringement

Plaintiff also claims that Defendants induced copyright infringement by distributing the photograph to third parties, that is, social media users who retweeted, pinned or liked the original social media post containing the infringing photograph. Plaintiff claims that, as such, they “stood in the shoes of the Plaintiff and licensed the image to Twitter,” citing Twitter’s Terms of Service which provide that by submitting content, users provide Twitter with a royalty-free license, thus allowing the social media site to make one’s tweets “available to the rest of the world and let others do the same.” Plaintiff is seeking actual, or, alternatively, statutory damages, for contributory infringement as well.

It is very unlikely that Plaintiff will be awarded any damages from any social media user. Plaintiff claims that the contributory infringement was intentional, but proving that it is would be impossible. As noted by Plaintiff himself, the photograph bore the Big Red trademark. As such, social media users were likely to believe that the use was legal, even if they knew that the copyright of the photograph was owned by Plaintiff, as he could very well have licensed it.

But this case got me thinking about copyright small claims courts. If such courts are ever established in the United States, would copyright owners sue social media users who had republished infringing material? Let’s say that social media users would ‘only’ face, for instance, a $50 fee awarded in a small claim court for having retweeted or pinned infringing material. Granted, only people posting under their real name could effectively be sued. But Facebook has a “use only your own name” policy, which is enforced, and many Pinterest or Twitter users post under their real name as a way to promote themselves and to build relationships and contacts. Fearing that retweeting a particular tweet may or may not lead to a fee would certainly have a chilling effect on speech, especially if the fees start to add up. Retweeting an ad may not necessarily contribute much to the marketplace of ideas, but the ad in our case meant to commemorate an historical event, and showcased one of the most famous U.S. monuments.

However, some may argue that having a way to make social users pay a fee for unauthorized use of protected work may eventually lead to people thinking twice before using images found online. The debate is likely to heat up if the issue of copyright small claims courts takes central stage in Congress (not likely for now).

Image is courtesy of Flickr user Jerry Huddleston under a CC BY 2.0 license.

 

This blog post was originally published on The 1709 Blog.

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Blog Post on the NYSBA EASL Blog re Athletes Fined over Tweets

Baseball BirdA blog post I wrote for the Entertainment, Arts and Sports Law Blog, sponsored by the Entertainment, Arts and Sports Law Section of the New York State Bar Association, about Athletes fined over tweets in the U.S. and in Europe, can be found here.

Image is Baseball Bird courtesy of Flickr user ensign_beedrill pursuant to a Creative Commons CC BY-SA 2.0 license

 
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