Google ‘Glasstiquette’ and Other Google Glass Issues

4429169213_891fa4271aThis is the third and last posts I wrote for  The Secure Times, the blog of the Privacy and Information Security Committee of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law.

I was sitting at an airport café a few weeks ago, and witnessed a group of friends having fun, speaking and laughing together around a table. Next to them was a middle-aged business man wearing Google Glass.

One of the members of the group spotted the glasses, and started a conversation with their wearer. The business man obliged, saying he liked them very much, and then said: Oh, and by the way, I just took a picture of you!

The mood of the group subtly changed. They politely ended the conversation and then, very slowly, as not to be rude, all turned their back to the business man.

I had just witnessed a Google Glass breach of etiquette, and for what is worth, it did not seem that the culprit was unaware of it.

Etiquette for a Wearable Computers World

Do we need new rules to live in a society where the person next from us on line at the supermarket counter, or worse, behind us at the pharmacy while we pick up drugs, may be able to take a photograph of us, or to film us, without us even noticing it?

Google itself seems to believe we do,  as it recently released a guide for ‘Google Glass Explorers,’ people who have been given the opportunity to test Google Glass, which are still not available for sale.

Well, it seems that the business man I witnessed at the airport broke one of the Do’s of the guide: ‘Ask for permission.’ While this seems just common sense if one if taking a photograph, how could we possibly ask for permission to film a crowd? Should we ask every single person for permission?

Google Glass and Law Enforcement

Knowing the answer to this question may be a matter of personal safety. A woman claimed this week that she was attacked and robbed in a bar at San Francisco while wearing Google Glass, and, according to her, it was because she was wearing Google Glass.

It seems that she was later able to retrieve her Google Glass. Interestingly, its camera had apparently recorded the incident, showing a man ripping the glasses off her face. Could the recoding be used as evidence?

Indeed, Google Glass may be used by law enforcement officials in the near future. New York’s finest, the NY Police Department, is experimenting with two pairs of Google Glass, to find out whether they could be used for police work. That could raise some interesting fourth amendment issues.

On the other hand, Google Glass may become the pet peeve of police officers in charge of enforcing road security.

A woman got a ticket in San Diego last October, for speeding, but also for wearing Google Glass, as 27602(a) of the California Vehicle Code forbids driving a motor vehicle if “a television receiver, a video monitor, or a television or video screen, or any other similar means of visually displaying a television broadcast or video signal that produces entertainment or business applications, is operating and is located in the motor vehicle at a point forward of the back of the driver’s seat, or is operating and the monitor, screen, or display is visible to the driver while driving the motor vehicle.”

The case was later dismissed, as the judge did not find enough evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Google Glass was switched on while its wearer was driving.

Is it safe for car drivers to wear Google Glass while driving? It may be banned soon by legislators, just as texting and using a telephone while driving is forbidden in most states. Some states, such as Illinois, have already introduced bills to that effect. It remains to be seen if they will be enacted; Reuters reported this week that Google is lobbying to stop these bills from becoming law.

Facial Recognition and Google Glass

Even though Google has not (yet) developed a facial recognition app for Google Glass, another company, NameTag has done so. It would allow Google Glass wearers to pick a suitable date among a crowd of strangers, by scanning social media information of people around them. That triggered concerns from Senator Al Franken (D-Minnesota), who sent aletter on February 5th to the President of NameTag, expressing his “deep concerns” about the new app  and urging him to delay its launch “until best practices for facial recognition technology are established.”

It is not the first time legislators are expressing concerns over the privacy issues involved in Google Glass, and it probably won’t be the last.

Source: The Secure Times

 

Image  is lunette  courtesy of Flickr user thierry ben abed pursuant to a CC BY-ND 2.0 license.

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Washington State May Soon Regulate Personal Information Collection by Drones

3097756010_ca754aa534Here is the second post I wrote this week for The Secure Times, the blog of the Privacy and Information Security Committee of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law.

Two Washington State bills are addressing the issue of government surveillance using drones, and the potential negative impact this could have on privacy.

The first bill, HB 1771, is a bi-partisan bill sponsored by Rep. David Taylor, R-Moxee, which was   introduced last year. It calls drones a “public unmanned aircraft system.”

HB 2789, is also sponsored by Rep. David Taylor. It calls drones “extraordinary sensing devices” and its Section 3(1) would have government use of drones “conducted in a transparent manner that is open to public scrutiny.”

Calling drones “devices” instead of “aircraft” has significance for a State famous for its aeronautic industry.  Indeed, while HB 1771 passed the House last week, HB 2789 stills lingers in Committee.

A Very Broad Definition of Personal Information

HB 2789 and HB 1771 both define what is “personal information” quite broadly, as it would not only encompass a social security or an I.D. number, but also “medical history, ancestry, religion, political ideology, or criminal or employment record.”

Interestingly, it would also encompass information that can be “a basis for inferring personal characteristics” such as “the record of the person’s presence, registration, or membership in an organization or activity, or admission to an institution” or even, “things done by or to such person,” a definition that is so broad that it may encompass just about anything that ever happens to an individual. This definition recognizes that drone surveillance allows for a 24/7 surveillance society.

Personal information also means IP and trade secret information.

Illegal Collection of Data by Drones Must be “Minimized”

Under section 4 of HB 2789, disclosure of personal information acquired by a drone must be conducted in a way that minimizes unauthorized collection and disclosure of personal information. It reprises the words of Section 5 of HB 1771, only replacing ‘public unmanned aircraft by ‘extraordinary sensing device.’

I am not sure that I interpreted section 4 correctly, so here is the full text:

All operations of an extraordinary sensing device or disclosure of personal information about any person acquired through the operation of an extraordinary sensing device must be conducted in such a way as to minimize the collection and disclosure of personal information not authorized under this chapter.

So the standard it not complete avoidance of unauthorized collection of personal information, but instead minimization of illegal collection. The wording may reflect the understanding of the legislature that, because of the amazing volume of data that may potentially be collected by drones, including “things done by or to such person,” it would be unrealistic to set a standard of complete avoidance of data collection.

Maybe this ”minimizing” standard set by HB 1771 and HB 2789 is a glimpse of the standards for future data protection law…

Warrant Needed to Collect Personal Information by Drones

Under Section 5 of HB 2789, a drone could to collect personal information pursuant to a search warrant, which could not exceed a period of ten days.

The standard to obtain a warrant under Section5 (3)(c) of HB 2789 and Section 6 (2) (c ) of HB 1771would be “specific and articulable facts demonstrating probable cause to believe that there has been, is, or will be criminal activity”

Under Section 5 (3)(d) of HB 2789, a petition for a search warrant would also have to include a statement that “other methods of data collection have been investigated and found to be either cost prohibitive or pose an unacceptable safety risk to a law enforcement officer or to the public. ”

So drones should be, at least for now, still considered an extraordinary method to be used in criminal investigations.  Such statement would not be necessary though under HB 1771.

Warrant could not exceed ten days under Section 5(5) of HB 2789, but could not exceed 48 hours under section 6(4)HB 1771, and thus HB 1771 would be much more protective for civil liberties. However, as we saw, it is unlikely that HB 1771 will ever be enacted into law.

Warrant Not Needed in Case of an Emergency

Both bills would authorize some warrantless use of drones.

However, under Section 7 of HB 2789 a warrant would not be needed if a law enforcement officer “reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists [involving] criminal activity and presents immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person,” and that the use of a drone is thus necessary.

Under Section 8 of HB 1771, it would only be necessary for the law enforcement officer to “reasonably determine that an emergency situation exists that involves immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person” which would require the use of drone, without requiring a pre-determination of criminal activity.

But even if an emergency situation does not involve criminal activity, section 8 of HB 2789 allows for the use of drones without a warrant if there is “immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person,” which would require the use of drones in order “to reduce the danger of death or serious physical injury.”

However, such use would only be authorized if it could be reasonably determined that such use of drones “does not intend to collect personal information and is unlikely to accidentally collect personal information,” and also that such use is not done “for purposes of regulatory enforcement.“

Both bills require that an application for a warrant be made within 48 hours after the warrantless use of a drone.

Fruits of the Poisonous Drone

Under section 10 of HB 2789 and section 10 of HB 1771, no personal information acquired illegally by a drone nor any evidence derived from it could be used as evidence in a court of law or by state authorities.

Handling Personal Information Lawfully Collected

Even if personal information has been lawfully collected by drones, such information may not be copied or disclosed for any other purpose than the one for which it has been collected, “unless there is probable cause that the personal information is evidence of criminal activity.”

If there is no such evidence, the information must be deleted within 30 days if the information was collected pursuant to a warrant and 10 days if was incidentally collected under section 11 of HB 2789, but would have to be deleted within 24 hours under section 11 of HB 1771.

Drone regulation is a new legal issue, but Washington  would not be the first State to regulate it. Many other States have introduced similar proposals, often not successfully however. But Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia have all enacted laws regulating the use of drones for surveillance purposes and North Carolina has enacted a two-year moratorium. It remains to be seen if and when federal legislation will be enacted.

Source: The Secure Times

Image  is last drones  courtesy of Flickr user farnea pursuant to a  CC BY-SA 2.0 license.

 

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Warrant Needed In Massachusetts to Obtain Cell Phone Records

143669025_394e1b6649I am blogging this week for The Secure Times, the blog of the Privacy and Information Security Committee of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law. Here is the first of this week’s posts.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled 5-2 on February 18 in Commonwealth v. Augustine that the government must first obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before obtaining two weeks worth of historical cell site location information (CSLI).

Defendant had been indicted for the 2004 murder of his former girlfriend. During the investigation, the prosecution filed for an order to obtain CSLI from the suspect’s cellular service provider, but the order was filed under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) of the Stored Communications Act (SCA). Under that law, the government does not need to show probable cause, but only needs to show specific and articulable facts showing “that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”

The order was granted by the Superior Court in September 2004. Defendant was indicted by a grand jury in 2011, and filed a motion to suppress evidence associated with his cell phone in November 2012.

A judge from the Superior Court granted his motion to suppress, reasoning that this was a search under article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights – which is similar to the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution – and thus a search warrant was required.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts appealed, arguing that the CSLI was a business record, held by a third party, and that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in this information as he had voluntarily revealed it to a third party.

This argument did not convince the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, ruling instead that defendant had an expectation of privacy in the CSLI and that the prosecution therefore needed to obtain a warrant based on probable cause to obtain this information.

The Third Party Doctrine

Why did the court find that the defendant had an expectation of privacy in his CSLI, even though this information was known by a third party, his cell phone service provider?

Under the U.S. Supreme Court third party doctrine, as stated in the U.S. v. Miller 1976 case and in the 1979 Smith v.Maryland case, a defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information revealed to third parties.

In Miller, the Supreme Court found that defendant has no expectation of privacy in his bank records, as they were “business records of the banks.” Similarly, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that installing and using a telephone pen register was not a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, and thus no warrant was required, because the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he had dialed.

First, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights affords more protection than the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Then, the Supreme Judicial Court distinguished Miller and Smith from the case, finding “significant difference” between these two cases and the case at stake. The Court noted that “the digital age has altered dramatically the societal landscape from the 1970’s.”

In Smith, the defendant had taken an affirmative step when dialing the numbers which had been communicated to the prosecution by the telephone company. He had to do it in order to be able to use his telephone service. As such, Smith had “identified] a discrete item of information…like a telephone number (or a check or deposit slip as in Miller) and then transmit it to the provider.”

But cell phone users do not transmit their data to their cell phone company in order to use the service. Instead, “CSLI is purely a function and product of cellular telephone technology, created by the provider’s system network.”

The court also noted that, while using a landline may only indicate that a particular party is at home, CSLI provides a detailed report of an individual’s whereabouts. The Massachusetts court quoted the State v. Earls case from the New Jersey Supreme Court, which stated that using a cell phone to determine the location of its owner “is akin to using a tracking device and can function as a substitute for 24/7 surveillance.”

As CSLI is business information “substantively different from the types of information and records contemplated by Smith and Miller,” the court concluded that it “would be inappropriate to apply the third-party doctrine to CSLI.” However, the court added that they saw “no reason to change [their] view thatthe third-party doctrine applies to traditional telephone records.”

Obtaining CSLI from a Cell Phone Provider is a Search and Thus Requires a Warrant

The court then proceeded to answer the question of whether the government needed a warrant to access the CSLI.

As CSLI informs law enforcement about the whereabouts of an individual, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court compared it to electronic monitoring devices such as a GPS. It noted that “it is only when such tracking takes place over extended periods of time that the cumulative nature of the information collected implicates a privacy interest on the part of the individual who is the target of the tracking,” quoting the Supreme Court U.S. v. Jones case, where Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito both noted in their concurring opinions that the length of a GPS surveillance is relevant to determine whether or not the individual monitored has or does not have an expectation of privacy.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found relevant the duration of the period of time for which historical CSLI was sought by the government. The government may only obtain historical CSLI, meeting the SCA standard of specific and articulable facts, if the time period is “too brief to implicate the person’s reasonable privacy interest,” but the two-week period covered in this case exceeds it.

The court’s ruling was about article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Supreme Court has not yet considered the issue of whether obtaining CSLI is a search under the Fourth Amendment. Since courts are split on this issue, it is likely that the Supreme Court will answer the question of whether a warrant is required to obtain cell phone location records quite soon.

Source: The Secure Times

Image  is Cell Phone Life Vest courtesy of Flickr user Counselman Collection pursuant to a  CC BY-SA 2.0 license.

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A Congressional Hearing About Fair Use

419527851_77ca29a596The House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, held a hearing on January 28 on The Scope of Fair Use.

What is Fair Use?

The doctrine of fair use, originally created by the courts, is now codified in §107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. The written testimony of Kurt Wimmer, General Counsel for the Newspaper Association of America, provided an interesting recap of some of the early fair use cases in his written testimony.

Fair use is an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement. To assess whether a particular unauthorized use of a work protected by copyright is fair, courts are using four factors enumerated by §107.

They are:

(1) the purpose and character of the use;

(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;

(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value, of the copyrighted work.

No single factor is determinative, but the first factor, purpose and character of the use, is usually considered the more important one by the courts, along with the fourth one, commercial use.

A recent Commerce Department Green Paper stated that fair use is “inherently fact-intensive” (p. 21). Indeed, as the fair use defense is a mixed question of law and fact, it may be difficult to predict with certainty the outcome of a particular case. However, one of the witnesses, Professor Peter Jaszi from American University, provided in his written testimony references to two recent scholarly articles demonstrating that fair use may actually be predictable (Professor Jaszi’s written testimony p. 5).

Some Transformative Works…

The first factor plays in defendant’s favor in a copyright infringement suit if his use of the protected work was “transformative.”  A transformative work was defined by the Supreme Court in 1994 as “add[ing] something new, with a further purpose or a different character, altering the first [work] with new expression, meaning or message.”

That is important, as the purpose of copyright, under article I, § 8, cl. 8. of the  U.S. Constitution, is to “promote the progress of science and useful arts.” If the new work is transformative, the other three factors, even the fourth factor, commercialism, carry less weight.

One of the witnesses invited to testify was David Lowery, who has recently published a list of the Fifty Undesirable Lyric Websites, that is, unlicensed lyrics sites publishing songs’ lyrics without seeking permission.

David Lowery, who is also a songwriter, noted in his written testimony that he receives revenues from some sites, but not from others. From his point of view, this unauthorized use competes with the revenue he receives from licensed sites. The site which made top of his list, RapGenius, allows users to annotate and comment on the lyrics posted.

The example of RapGenius is interesting, as it is a lyrics and text annotation site. Users are invited to participate by adding their own comments and explanations about the lyrics posted on the site. Is this copyright infringement, or should this type of work be protected by fair use? Under §106 of the Copyright Act, the owner of the copyright has the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work, but specifically subjects this right to §107.

Derivative work? Transformative work? What RapGenius does could also be described as mass digitization, which in turn may benefit the public by enabling research and comments. For instance, a blog used RapGenius to write a post about the frequency of some words in rap songs. I was interested reading that ‘crouton’, ‘sushi’ and ‘lobster’ are words shunned by rappers…

Anyway, RapGenius has recently entered into a licensing agreement with Universal Music.

But transformative works do not necessarily create a new work, they also may be transformative because they make a new use of prior protected works.

Not all the witnesses were of that opinion however. Professor June Besek from Columbia University expressed her concerns about this interpretation of a ‘transformative’ work,  noting that this “enables new business models, not new works of authorship. “ Kurt Wimmer testified that the transformative use concept has started to ascend since the late Nineties and that this has “unsettled the marketplace.”

New Uses of Protected Works

Of course, the mass digitization project to trump all mass digitization projects is the Google Books case.

In the recent Authors Guild v. Google case, Judge Denny Chin, from the Southern District Court of New York, found that Google’s mass digitization of books for its Google Books Project was “highly transformative,” as it had created “a comprehensive word index that helps readers, scholars, researchers, and others find books.” Judge Chin concluded that “[i]n [his] view, Google Books provides significant public benefits.”

Judge Chin quoted the Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersly case where the Second Circuit found in 2006 that the unauthorized use of thumbnails images of Grateful Dead posters in a book was fair use.

Kurt Wimmer testified that he did not agree with the court in the Bill Graham case, while Naomi Novik, a bestselling author who founded the Organization for Transformative Works, instead told members of Congress that, in her view, the use of the Grateful Dead posters was transformative, and did not replace the original work, as the chronological timeline of posters allowed readers to easily observe the transformation of their style throughout the years.

In that case, defendant had published a 480-page coffee table book about the story of the Grateful Dead, using a timeline format through the book which combined more that 2000 images in thumbnail format presented chronologically. Plaintiffs sued over the unauthorized use of seven images.

The Second Circuit emphasized in its first fair use factor reasoning that the work was a biography. Since §107 cites scholarship and research as one of the possible categories of fair use, the nature of the work played in defendant’s (and fair use) favor.

Here, 2,000 images were at stake, a rather modest number. Could  mass digitization be fair use?

Professor June Besek expressed concerns in her written testimony about whether fair use should indeed protect “copying the full contents of millions of works” (emphasis by Professor Besek, p. 3 of her testimony).

For Professor Besek, fair use is “extraordinarily expanding” as copying the content of millions of works may now qualify as fair use, and advised Congress to address the issue of mass digitization which, she believes, “is skewing the law.” Professor Besek concluded her written testimony by suggesting that “Congress might separately address the problems of mass digitization, including whether authors should be compensated for publicly beneficial uses” noting that, right now, compensation is not an option under §107.

A recent Southern District of New York case, cited by Kurt Wimmer in his written testimony, found that Meltwater, a SaaS offering news monitoring services to its clients, had infringed the copyright of the Associated Press when it scraped AP news from online sources using automated computer algorithms. The SDNY did not find the use transformative, as it did not add ”any commentary or insight in its News Reports.”  Instead, Meltwater was acting as a substitute.

However, Professor Jaszi testified that the recent mass digitization cases from the SDNY Google Book cases were “excellent examples“ of the fair use doctrine “fulfilling its purpose.”

Do We Need a Fair Use Reform?

Professor Jaszi does not believe so, stating that “fair use is working.” He warned Congress in his written testimony that “tweaks or improvements… could have serious and adverse unintended consequences” and would discourage new creativity (p.7 of Prof. Jaszi’s testimony).

However, he also testified that fair use could use legislative support, for instance by exempting non-commercial creators of derivative work from potential statutory damages, as this chills the exercise of free speech. Indeed, defendants may be taking a gamble when deciding to go to court, instead of merely taking down the allegedly infringing work after having been contacted by the copyright owner of the original work,as they risk having to pay statutory damages

Professor Jaszi cited while testifying the January 27, 2014 Second Circuit decision, Swatch Group v. Bloomberg, where the Second Circuit found that the unauthorized publication by Bloomberg of a sound recording of a conference call to discuss Swatch’s recently released earning report with investment analysts was fair use.

The Second Circuit held there that:

“[i]n the context of news reporting and analogous activities, moreover, the need to convey information to the public accurately may in some instances make it desirable and consonant with copyright law for a defendant to faithfully reproduce an original work rather than transform it. In such cases, courts often find transformation by emphasizing the altered purpose or context of the work, as evidenced by surrounding commentary or criticism

The public interest to access information was thus served. In this case, no copyrightable work was created, but useful knowledge has been disseminated, and that benefits the public.

Should Fair Use Law be Updated?

Professor Jaszi does not believe that fair use needs to be updated to adapt to “the new conditions of digital information exchange” as the doctrine is flexible enough to adapt to new practices such as remixes or mass digitization (written testimony p. 6). Kurt Wimmer does not believe the law needs to be changed either, and wrote that the NAAA “believes that the courts, rather than Congress, should … be the appropriate forum for resolving issues surrounding fair use” (written testimony p. 6).

In her written testimony, Naomi Novik urged Congress “to resist any suggestion of narrowing fair use, including by trying to replace it with licensing.”

However, Professor Besek warned in her written testimony that “[a]n increasingly expansive fair use exception risks violating each of the [TRIPS Three Step Test]” as stated by Annex 1C, article 13 of the TRIPS:

Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.”

It remains to be seen if Congress will undertake reforming fair use law.

Image is courtesy of Flickr user R.B. Boyer pursuant to a  CC BY-SA 2.0 license.


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Accessing Unsecured Documents via a Google Search Found Illegal by a French Court of Appeals

3582507128_0c324ccaafThe Paris Court of Appeals found on February 5, 2014, that a blogger, who had accessed documents published on the extranet of the French food safety agency following a link found through a Google research result, was guilty of having remained fraudulently in an automatic data processing system. He was also found guilty of having stolen information.

Under article 323-1 of the French criminal Code, fraudulently accessing or remaining within all or part of an automated data processing system is punishable by two years imprisonment and a €30,000 fine. Fraudulent access occurs when a person enters an automated data processing system without authorization, knowing that she has no authorization.

In this case, the blogger, Olivier Laurelli, found the documents by chance while doing a Google search. He downloaded 8,000 files, 7.7 gigaoctets worth of data, and used some of these documents to illustrate a blog post on the danger of nanomaterials.

But these documents were not meant to be public, and were accessible only because of a security failure, as the documents had been mistakenly set as being readable.  Google had therefore been able to index them and this is why they had appeared in Laurelli’s search results.

The trial court found Laurelli not guilty in April 2013, but the prosecutor appealed. The agency chose not to appeal, perhaps not wanting to publicize further its extranet access security shortcomings.

Not Guilty of Fraudulent Access to Unsecure Intranet

The Paris Court of Appeals held that the evidence could not sufficiently establish that the blogger was guilty of fraudulent access in an automated data processing system, as he had only been able to access the data because the security failure.

But Guilty of Remaining Fraudulently in the System

However, the court noted that Laurelli admitted that, after stumbling upon the pages where the documents had been uploaded, he had traveled the extranet structure up to its entrance and had been able to see that it was protected by a password. The court noted that he was thus aware that the documents were not meant to be public. Therefore, he was found to have remained fraudulently in the agency’s system, and fined 3,000 Euros.

The trial court had reasoned differently when finding Mr. Laurelli not guilty, stating that he could have legitimately thought that, while some of the data on the site required an access code and a password, the data he had collected were free to access and that he could remain legitimately in the system.

Data Theft

As for data theft, the trial court had also found Mr. Laurelli not guilty, reasoning that the data had not been materially subtracted from the site. Even if Mr. Laurellli had indeed downloaded and saved it, it remained available and accessible to all on the server. Therefore the material element of the crime, taking someone else’s property, was not constituted.

However, the Court of Appeals, without elaborating, found that Mr. Laurelli had indeed stolen these files.

Laurelli has announced he will take the case to the French civil Supreme Court, the Cour de Cassation.

Image is courtesy of Flickr user Marcin Wichary pursuant to a CC BY 2.0  license.

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Not Up to Snuff: Perfume Still Not Protected by Copyright in France

9464136024_2cc804c6fbThe French civil Supreme Court, the Cour de Cassation, reaffirmed on December 10, 2013 that perfumes are not copyrightable under French law.

In this case, a man had been sued for possessing counterfeit bottles of perfume at an open-air market in France, among them counterfeited bottles of Trésor, a best-selling Lancôme perfume. Lancôme and others perfume companies sued him for copyright and trademark infringement.

Lancôme and the other companies argued that since article L. 112-1 of the French Intellectual Property Code (FIPC) protects “all works of the mind, whatever their kind, form of expression, merit or purpose,” the fragrance of a perfume is therefore a work of the mind protectable under French law. They also argued that a perfume is original, and thus protectable, because it shows the creative input of its author.

The Court of Appeals of Nancy had held, following the general view of French courts, that a perfume is not copyrightable, but rather only implements a know-how and thus cannot benefit from the protection of the FIPC.

The Cour de Cassation was not convinced by the plaintiff’s arguments and confirmed that French copyright “protects creations in their tangible form, so far as they are identified with sufficient precision to allow their communication; the fragrance of a perfume, which, outside of its development process, which is not in itself a work of the mind, does not have itself a form with [the] characteristic [of a work of a mind] and therefore cannot be protected by copyright.

General Principles of French Copyright Law

Article  L.111-1 states as a general principle that the author of a “work of a mind” enjoys, by the mere  creation of the work, an exclusive incorporeal property right enforceable against all. The law, however, does not define what is a “work of the mind.” Article L112-2 enumerates what is protected by French copyright, but the list is not exhaustive, and does not help define what “work of the mind” really means. Indeed, cutting grass, or baking, can also be described as works of the mind. That does not make a neatly clipped lawn or a batch of chocolate and orange cookies (my specialty) protectable by French copyright.

Even the Most Mundane Work of the Mind Can Be Protected

Article L.112-1 states that the FIPC “protects the rights of authors in all works of the mind, whatever their kind, form of expression, merit or purpose.” This article codifies the theory of art unity (unité de l’art) which allows the most mundane objects to be protected, as long as they have been created by an “author.”

To be Protected, a Work of the Mind Must Bear the Personality of the Author

However, only original works are protected. The law does not, however, define what “original” means. One way for French courts to decide whether a particular work of the mind is indeed original is to find out whether one can discern in it the personality of its author.

For example, the Cour de Cassation upheld on January 29, 2013, the decision of a Court of Appeal which had refused the protection of copyright to a piece of furniture because it ”was able to deduce from the absence of the imprint of the personality of the author on the disputed models, which would have made them original” and that they are therefore not protectable by copyright.

What About Perfumes?

One could argue that a perfume, or at least some perfumes, posses the imprint of the personality of their authors. Chanel Number 5, probably the most famous perfume in the world, was presented last year at an exhibition in Paris, cosponsored by the Chanel company, as reflecting the personality of Coco Chanel. The couturière had, however, commissioned in the 1920’s Numéro 5 by French perfumer Ernest Beaux.

But the French courts refuse to consider that the “nose” who creates perfume is an author. The Cour de Cassation confirmed a Court of Appeals on  June 6, 2006, which had held that a ‘nose’ could not be considered an author under the FIPC, and thus could not ask the company selling the perfume to give her royalties from the sale of this perfume.

The Cour de Cassation held that “the fragrance of a perfume, which comes from the simple implementation of expertise, is not, within the meaning of [article L.112-1 and L. 112-2 of the FIPC], the creation of a form of expression that can benefit from the protection of works of the mind  by copyright.”

Before the June 6, 2006 holding, some French lower courts had granted copyright protection to perfumes, and a few days after the Cour de Cassation case, the Dutch High Court ruled that perfumes are copyrightable (Kecofa B.V. v. Lancôme Parfums et Beauté) (see here for more information on the case).

What About Trademarks?

Interestingly, it may soon become easier to trademark a perfume in the European Union (EU). Under current EU law, it is possible to register as a trademark a sign which is not and of itself capable of being perceived visually, if it can be represented graphically. Under European Court of Justice case law, Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent-und Markenamt (C-273/00), the representation must be clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective. This case ruled out scents to be registered as trademarks in the EU.

But this may soon change. The European Commission published last March a proposal for a Regulation which would amend Council Regulation number 207/2009 on the Community trade mark (CTMR), and a Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, which would recast Directive 2008/95/EC (TMD).

Article 2 of the Directive regarding “signs of which a trade mark may consist,” which would become article 3, would have a new paragraph (b) stating that a trademark may indeed consist of any signs, provided that such signs are capable of “being represented in a manner which enables the competent authorities and the public to determine the precise subject of the protection afforded to its proprietor.”

Savvy trademark practitioners will certainly then find convincing ways to “represent” a perfume. This may indirectly help IP attorneys to argue successfully in front of French courts that a perfume is identified in such a precise way that it can indeed be protected by the FIPC.

Image is  Find ick dufte!  courtesy of Flickr user Dennis Skley pursuant to a CC BY-ND 2.0  license.

 

 

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Gentrification, Moral Rights and Graffiti Art: a New York Story

@ 5pointzOn November 12, 2013, Senior District Judge Block from the Eastern District Court of New York (EDNY) declined to issue an injunction which would have prevented the 5Pointz buildings in Long Island, New York, to be demolished. The EDNY published its opinion on November 20. The case is Cohen v. G&M Realty LP.

The seventeen plaintiffs in this case are graffiti artists who had painted their works on the walls of 5Pointz, which would be destroyed by demolishing the buildings. This is why they filed suit against defendants, real estate development companies and owners of the buildings, asking the EDNY to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent 5Pointz from being torn down.

Plaintiffs argued that any intentional distortion, mutilation, modification or destruction of 24 of their works would be prejudicial to their honor and reputation pursuant to the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), the federal law which provides some moral rights to some visual artworks.

5Pointz

5Pointz is not just one building, but several buildings in Queens covering 200,000 square feet which have been covered by graffiti since the mid 90’s or so. In 2002, one of the plaintiffs, Jonathan Cohen, a professional artist under the name “Meres One, approached Gerald Wolkoff, who owns the building, to become the curator of the space. Wolkoff agreed and Cohen started selecting which artists could display their works. Each artist retained all copyrights to their work, and none were paid.

Graffiti artists from all around the world came to the site, which became known as 5 Pointz. The ever-changing facades and interiors became world-famous and were quite a sight from the 7 line, as the train snaked around the buildings.

What are Moral Rights?

Moral rights are non-economic rights that authors may enjoy, and are even considered human rights under article 27-2° of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”

Moral rights are:

a) The right of first disclosure, that is, the right to reconsider the work or to withdraw its publication; b) the right of attribution, that is, the right to be recognized as the author of the work, or to publish the work anonymously; and c) the right of integrity, that is, the right to have the work respected and to prevent is mutilation or distortion.

The Visual Artists Rights of 1990

VARA recognizes only two moral rights, the right of attribution and the right of integrity. However, the scope of VARA is limited to works of visual arts, defined by 17 U.S.C. § 101 as single copies of drawing, print or sculpture, or limited editions of 200 copies or fewer signed and numbered by the author.

Artists have the right to claim authorship of a work and the right to prevent its distortion or mutilation or other modification which would be prejudicial to the artist’s honor or reputation , 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A). They also have the right to prevent its destruction if the work is “of recognized stature” under 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).

What is a Work of Art of “Recognized Stature”?

VARA, however, does not define what “recognized stature” means. The Southern District Court of New York (SDNY) proposed in 1994 in Carter v. Helmsley-Spear to use a two-tiered test to prove such stature.

First, plaintiff must show that the work has stature, meaning that it is ‘meritorious’. This is necessary as copyright protects works of authorship as long as they are original, but the level of originality required is very low. No need to be Picasso to have one’s drawings protected by copyright. But a ‘meritorious’ work would induce some awe that a competent amateur drawing may not bring.

But whose opinion about the work should the judge take into consideration? The second tier of the SDNY Carter test requires the plaintiff to prove that the stature is ‘recognized’ by art experts, the artistic community, or by some cross-section of society, but not necessarily everybody.

The EDNY acknowledged the two-tiered Carter test, and heard testimony from three of the seventeen plaintiffs during a preliminary injunction hearing. The court also heard expert testimony. Defendant’s art expert testified that in her view, people came to see 5Pointz not to see a particular work, but to see the ensemble.

The court seems to have been convinced by this testimony, as it found that 5Pointz could not be protected by VARA, as the law only protects a work of visual art, while 5Pointz is a “tourist site.”

The Transient Nature of Graffiti Art

Artists took turn at 5Pointz to cover some parts of the buildings, which were used to rotate quickly from one art work to another. Cohen is quoted in a 2007 interview with the Christian Monitor, cited by the EDNY, that some works only last 12 hours, some remain for two years.

Some walls, however, bore artworks which Cohen wanted to preserve, not allowing subsequent artists to paint over, among them the 24 works of the plaintiffs in this case.

The transient nature of graffiti, even its ephemeral nature, also weighed in the EDNY decision, as Judge Block noted that, because the artists knew that the buildings were intended to be demolished, they had “created their own hardships.”

During the trial, Wolkoff, the owner of the building, testified that he had told Cohen that the buildings would eventually be torn down. Some of the 5Pointz artists also testified that they knew the buildings would be eventually be torn down.

The EDNY also quoted a 2002 NDNY case, Pollara v.Seymour, where the court denied VARA protection to a mural commissioned to the artist as a “single use” piece for a particular event, reasoning that “[i]t defies the underlying purposes of VARA to assume that the statute was intended to protect works of artistic merit without regard to whether…[they] were otherwise intended to be preserved for posterity as works of artistic merit.”

The owners of 5Pointz have now white washed the buildings. However, the case is not over and a trial court will review whether plaintiffs are entitled to damages. While doing so, it will decide whether the 24 works are of recognized stature under VARA. If the trial court recognizes the plaintiff’s works are of “recognized stature” under VARA, defendants may have to pay monetary damages to the artists.

The EDNY noted that New York City could have exercised its power of eminent domain to acquire the site, but it chose not to do so. That leaves us with the regret that 5Pointz will not become officially what it had been, unofficially, for years: the world’s greatest museum of graffiti, in the very city where this art was first born.

Image is @5pointz courtesy of Flickr user Pelle Sten pursuant to a CC BY 2.0 license.

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Ethnic Origin, Disparagement and the Trademark Act: Another Slanted Case?

4687481390_0d608449e6The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) affirmed last month the USPTO refusal to register the mark THE SLANTS because it is considered  disparaging. The case is In re Simon Shia Tam.

Simon Tam, the applicant, is the bassist of The Slants, a music group from Portland, Oregon, which plays dance rock music. Members of the group are all Asian Americans.

In November 2011, Mr. Tam filed a trademark application for the mark THE SLANTS in international class 41 which covers “entertainment in the nature of live performance by a musical band.” The USPTO refused to register the trademark as it considered the mark to be disparaging. The USPTO made the refusal final and Mr. Tam appealed to the TTAB, which affirmed.

A Two-Factors Test to Determine if a Trademark is Disparaging

The Lanham Act, U.S.C § 1052(a), prevents the registration of a trademark which “may disparage.

The TTAB noted in its Harjo v. Pro-Football 1999 decision that determining if a matter is disparaging is “highly subjective.” In Harjo, the TTAB established a two-part test to determine if a particular mark is disparaging, which is now used by the USPTO and the TTAB when determining whether a matter may be disparaging under Trademark Act Section 2(a):

(1) What is the likely meaning of the matter in question, taking into account not only dictionary definitions, but also the relationship of the matter to the other elements in the mark, the nature of the goods and/or services, and the manner in which the mark is used in the marketplace in connection with the goods and/or services; and

(2)  If that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols, whether that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial composite of the referenced group.

What is the Likely Meaning of THE SLANTS and Is It Disparaging?

The examining USPTO attorney found that SLANTS was disparaging, as it is “a negative term regarding the shape of the eyes of certain persons of Asian descent” and was “an inherently offensive term that has a long history of being used to deride and mock a physical feature of those individuals.” The examining attorney provided several dictionary definitions to support his statement. He also noted that “the band’s name has been found offensive numerous times” and that the Japanese American Citizens League stated that the term “slant” is derogatory and should not be used.

The examining attorney again provided evidence in its appeals brief that the meaning of ‘slant’ in this particular application was one demeaning to people of Asian descent.

When answering the Office Action, applicant had argued that ‘Slants’ is a “plain English word… that only could, but need not, have a disparaging connotation” and submitted into evidence dictionary definitions in that sense. Applicant argued that the cases cited by the examining attorney in the office action were all cases where the meaning of the term could only be disparaging, such as ‘squaw’ or ‘heeb,’ whereas ‘slant’ could or could not be disparaging.

Applicant used the same argument in appeals, and submitted as evidence to the TTAB dictionary entries providing several meanings for “slant” as well as several trademark registrations for SLANT. But in these cases, the meaning of slant was “slope.” He also argued that the USPTO seemed to have refused to register the trademark because of the particular ethnic descent of the applicant, a statement which probably did not help his cause, but that the band nevertheless continues to claim on social media.

Indeed, many words have different meanings. What is important under the two-part test is the ‘likely meaning’ of the term in a particular trademark application.

Should Self-Disparaging Trademarks be Registered?

In an article on self-disparaging trademarks published in 2006 in the Columbia Law Review, Todd Anten noted that “[t]he reappropriation of slurs is a common source of empowerment among disparaged groups” (p.392).

It seems indeed that Mr. Tam chose to name his music group ‘the slants’ because of the disparaging use of the term, albeit not to disparage, but to reclaim the term. The examining attorney pointed that out in his final action letter: “Further, applicant (and his fellow band members) have repeatedly indicated that the name THE SLANTS is in fact a direct reference to the derogatory meaning of the term and in fact, they are embracing the derogatory meaning of the term.”

Mr. Tam had first tried the register THE SLANTS as a trademark in 2010, but did not succeed, on the same disparaging grounds, and the trademark was abandoned. In the response to the office action to this first trademark application, Mr. Tam argued then that THE SLANTS was “a positive term of self-reference that promotes cultural pride and recognition.”

Mr. Tama then wrote in a 2011 blog post that by registering a term which is derogatory toward Asians, his goal was to reclaim it: “We deliberately chose this outdated, generational term to inject pride into Asian American culture.” For example, The Slants’ debut album was called Slanted Eyes. Another of its albums is called Yellow Album. However, as noted by the USPTO examining attorney,“[t]he lack of a disparaging intent is not dispositive on the issue of Section 2(a) disparagement in the Federal registration analysis.” In other words, having the best of intentions is not a defense.

In a somewhat similar case, the USPTO ultimately accepted the register DIKES ON BIKES, albeit after quite a bit of back-and-forth correspondence with the registrant, a group of homosexual women organizing motorcycles rides. But in that case, the USPTO finally accepted to register the trademark as it was convinced that most members of the referenced group, homosexual women, accepted the term ‘dikes’ as non disparaging.

The Referenced Group

Mr. Tam argued when answering the first office action letter in his first attempt to register the trademark that “members of the referenced group have widely embraced Applicant’s Mark” and submitted evidence about the success of The Slants within the Asian community.

But it seems that the only way applicant could have convinced the USPTO/TTAB that the term ‘slants’ used in the trademark was not disparaging was to provide convincing evidence that a substantial composite of the referenced group does not consider ‘slant’ as demeaning, because, under the second part of the test, the meaning of the term has to be disparaging to a substantial composite of the referenced group.

That means in practice that the disparaging meaning of the term must already have been reclaimed by the majority of the referenced group before the trademark can be registered, and applicant must provide evidence of such to the USPTO or the TTAB. Applicant apparently failed at providing such evidence in his first trademark registration attempt. He choose instead to argue at his second attempt at registration that the term is not disparaging, and that the reason the trademark registration was denied is because of applicant’s ethnic background, a rather inflammatory argument.

The case seems ripe for appeal. Stay tuned…

Image is Chinatown at night courtesy of Flickr user Corey Burger pursuant to a CC BY-SA 2.0 license.

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Parody Social Media Accounts & the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

2291127824_087a497beaThe U.S. District Court of Oregon dismissed last month a suit brought by a middle school assistant principal claiming that, by creating fake social media accounts using his name and likeness, some students had violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).

Plaintiff Adam Matot is assistant principal of a middle school in Oregon. He claimed that two or more students there created fake social media accounts on Facebook and Twitter using Plaintiff’s name and likeness. The Facebook account had some seventy “friends,” which were allegedly able to see obscene pictures and read comments defamatory to the Plaintiff when accessing the fake account.

Plaintiff filed a first complaint last January, alleging computer fraud and abuse under the CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, and defamation.

He later filed an amended complaint, also naming the parents of one of the minors as defendants and claiming that they had negligently failed to supervise their child.

One of the parents filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction which was granted by the District Court of Oregon on September 26.

Creating Parody Social Media Accounts Not a Violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

The CFAA is a federal law which prohibits access to a computer without authorization or exceeding authorization, with intent to defraud while using the computer.

§ 1030(a)(6) defines exceeding authorized access as “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”

Congress enacted this law in 1984 to fight computer hackers, yet some plaintiffs over the years have been trying to expand the scope of the law to support various claims. However, interpreting broadly a criminal statute is dangerous for civil liberties. Just think of it: a teenager playing games past his curfew is accessing the family computer without authorization, but should he be tried in a federal court for that offense?

In our case, Plaintiff claimed that, by violating the Terms of Service of the social networking site, defendants used their services without authorization and exceeded their authorization and thus violated the CFAA. The computers allegedly abused were those operating social media sites.

But the Oregon District Court was not convinced by the arguments, citing a 2012 Ninth Circuit case, U.S. v. Nosal, about a breach of company policy forbidding disclosure of confidential information. Chief Judge Kozinski, who wrote the opinion, noted that interpreting the CFAA broadly would make shopping or playing games on company’s time, using the employer’s computer, a federal crime. The Ninth Circuit held that exceeding authorized access within the meaning of the CFAA “does not extend to violations of use restrictions” (Nosal at 863).

Bullying

In the United States v. Drew case the prosecution unsuccessfully argued that a woman posing as 16-year-old boy on MySpace had violated the site’s Terms of Service prohibiting users to lie about their age or name and therefore had violated the CFAA. In this case, the woman used the fake account to develop an online relationship with one of her daughter’s classmates, a 13-year-old who later committed suicide shortly after the fake 17-year old told her harsly he di not want to be friends with her anymore. Cyber-bullying is a serious issue, and may have tragic consequences.

Plaintiff described in his first complaint the teenagers who created the fake social media accounts as bullies. But how would you describe an educator who claimed that some of the children he is in charge of educating should face prison sentences because they mocked him?

Plaintiff went after Defendants, minors who were students at the school where he is assistant principal, with a very heavy hand, even claiming  in the amended complaint, that he should be granted leave to state a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) in case his claim under the CFAA would be dismissed…

As noted by Magistrate Judge Coffin in one of the two Findings and Recommendations that he filed, Congress enacted RICO to address organized crime and its economic consequences. Judge Coffin wrote that “Congress did not intend to target the misguided attempts at retribution by juvenile middle school students against an assistant principal in enacting RICO.”

While it may seem laughable that a federal law targeting organized crime should be a remedy for a (very) stupid student prank, I am also concerned about the negative consequence that such a suit could have on teenagers. Being sued in court under a federal criminal statute can be very scary, even for an adult.

Also, Plaintiff had asked the court for damages, punitive damages, limitation on the defendant’s Internet use and “forfeiture of equipment,’ which, I assume, are computers and/or hand-held devices used to create the fake accounts. He also asked the court to enjoin the teenagers from participating on social networking sites, at least for a “reasonable” period of time. Such a ruling would arguably have run afoul of the First Amendment.

Plaintiff also tried to characterize the material posted online as “pornographic and obscene material of a prurient nature.” Such speech is not protected by the First Amendment, but the Court was probably not convinced that the posts were pornographic. Plaintiff could have been more successful at pursuing a defamation claim in State court, but since the case was dismissed, one can only speculates on how a court would have ruled in this case.

Image is Computer on Fire courtesy of Flickr user Matt Mets pursuant to a CC BY 2.0 license.

 

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Two New California Laws: Right to be Forgotten for Minors and Protection from Cyber Revenge

3563325190_8a682d4b93California  enacted on September 23rd a “right to be forgotten” law. SB 568 was passed to give “Privacy Rights for California Minors in the Digital World.” The law, which is now part of the California Online Privacy Protection Act, will take effect on January 1, 2015.

Under §22581(a) of the law, operators of web sites or apps “directed to minors” which have “actual knowledge” that a minor is using the site/app, must allow minors who are registered users of their service “to remove or, if the operator prefers, to request and obtain removal of, content or information posted on the operator’s Internet Web site, online service, online application, or mobile application by the user.”

Operators must provide notice to minors that such removal service is available to them and also provide them “clear instructions” on how to remove or to request removal of content or information. The notice must also inform minors that the removal “does not ensure complete or comprehensive removal of the content or information posted.”

Exceptions to the Right to Be Forgotten

There are five exceptions to this obligation to erase information:

1. A federal or a state law requires maintaining the content or information

2. The content or information was stored on or posted by a third party, including any content or information posted by the minor that was stored, republished, or reposted by the third party

3. The operator anonymizes the content or information posted by the minor in such way that the minor cannot be individually identified

4. The minor does not follow the instructions provided by the operator on how to erase or require deletion of the information or content

5. The minor has received compensation or other consideration for providing the content

Is Content Really Deleted?

Many sites already offer a delete button. Minors (and majors) can delete tweets and Facebook posts and it is easy to delete a blog post or even an entire blog in a few seconds. However, one can never be sure that the information has been deleted from servers.

Also, as data is frequently republished by third parties, deleting all the subsequent reposting of that information is impossible, hence the necessity of the third-party republication exception of the California law.

The Particular Issue of Cyber Revenge

This is good news from a free speech point of view, but it is not good news for victims of cyber bullying and cyber revenge. The New York Times published a sobering article on revenge porn last week, describing the plight of a young girl whose former boyfriend had posted online intimate pictures of her out of spite.

The article mentions that owners and operators of porn revenge sites are in most cases protected by federal law.

Indeed, under Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. §230, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” The law provides a safe harbor to Internet service providers from speech posted by a third party.

Section 230 of the CDA has, however, no effect on criminal law or intellectual property law. That means that if the image of a naked minor is posted on a porn revenge site, and the State where the posting took place considers that such posting constitutes child pornography, the porn revenge site will not be able to use Section 230 of the CDA as a defense.

Also, if a posting falsely implies that the person featured would freely engage in sexual activities if asked and/or paid for this service, it would defamatory, and the victim could sue the site. However, most posts show a picture and identify the subject of the photograph, without further comment.

Copyright law could also be used to have a photograph taken down, but only if the subject of the photograph owns its copyright. That would be the case if racy ‘selfie’ is emailed to, say, a boyfriend, who later posted it on a site out of spite. In that case, the subject of the photograph could use another federal law, the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, to require the site to takedown the photograph. In order to be protected by copyright however, the ‘selfie’ would have to be original, but the threshold for protection is low.

It could also be argued that porn revenge is a breach of the federal stalking law, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, passed as part of the Violence Against Women Act. This act, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) specifically incriminates stalking using a computer.

Another new California law, SB 255, was enrolled on September 19 and specifically addresses the issue of cyber revenge. It is now a crime in California to publicize the picture of someone partially or completely naked, even if the person has given his consent to have this picture taken, defined as follows:

Any person who photographs or records by any means the image of the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable person, under circumstances where the parties agree or understand that the image shall remain private, and the person subsequently distributes the image taken, with the intent to cause serious emotional distress, and the depicted person suffers serious emotional distress.”

The author of the bill, California Senator Anthony Cannella, argued that such law was necessary to protect victims of cyber-bullying, especially since some victims have committed suicide as a result of being bullied online.

The ACLU opposed the bill, arguing that “[t]he posting of otherwise lawful speech or images even if offensive or emotionally distressing is constitutionally protected. The speech must constitute a true threat or violate another otherwise lawful criminal law, such as stalking or harassment statute, in order to be made illegal. The provisions of this bill do not meet that standard.”

The ACLU cited in its argument the United States v. Cassidy case, where the defendant had argued that 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A) violated the First Amendment because it was overbroad. The District Court of Maryland found in favor of defendant, reasoning that the government’s indictment was directed at protected speech, described by the court as “anonymous, uncomfortable Internet speech addressing religious matters” (at 583).

The court also noted that this speech did not fall into any of the categories of speech outside First Amendment protection, that is, obscenity, fraud, defamation, true threats, incitement, or speech integral to criminal conduct.

The questions of whether porn revenge postings are protected by the First Amendment remains an open question, likely to be answered at one point by a court of law.

Image is Graffiti courtesy of Flickr user Cliff Beckwith pursuant to a CC BY 2.0 license.

 

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